



Securing Your PostgreSQL Data: A Comprehensive Guide to Protecting Your Database Assets

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Who am I

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PG Day Chicago is on April 26, 2024!



USER: POSTGRES

SCHEMA: PUBLIC

-
- Securing data is a high priority
- PostgreSQL has everything
- Still...

What will be covered

- Common security challenges
- The necessity of standardization and its role in solving these challenges
- Adopted security models and their practical implementations
- Addressing a wide spectrum of access control needs
- Using automation to streamline security
- Ongoing issues and future prospects

Challenge #1: PostgreSQL does not force you to create roles and schemas in order to start.

And all examples in documentation create objects in PUBLIC schema!

- 5.4. System Columns
- 5.5. System Columns
- 5.6. Modifying Tables
 - 5.6.1. Adding a Column
 - 5.6.2. Removing a Column
 - 5.6.3. Adding a Constraint
 - 5.6.4. Removing a Constraint
 - 5.6.5. Changing a Column's Default Value
 - 5.6.6. Changing a Column's Data Type
 - 5.6.7. Renaming a Column
 - 5.6.8. Renaming a Table
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- 5.8. Row Security Policies
- 5.9. Schemas
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As a result...

- Applications are developed using postgres user
- When they move to production, developer either forget to change the user or run into permissions problems they ~~do not have time~~ do not know how to fix
- When an application uses connection pools different application users can connect as the same database user

Challenge #2: The wonders of inheritance

- Starting from PG 7.3, there is no distinction between users and roles

(user=role+login)

```
create role role1;
```

```
create role role2 login password 'pwd';
```

```
create user user1 password 'pwd';
```

- All of the grants below will work:

```
grant role1 to role2;
```

```
grant role2 TO user1;
```

```
grant user1 to role2;
```

... and if later you will execute

```
create role role3;
```

```
grant role3 to role1 ---will be inherited
```

**Challenge #3: You think you
created a role for a database?
Think again!**

- Roles are created on the instance level, not the database level
- If there are several databases on one instance, all users will have access to **all** databases, because...
By default, all user have **CONNECT** privilege to all databases on the instance
- Until PG 15, all users could create objects in **PUBLIC** schema. That includes public schema in all databases on the same instance.
- If a customer requested a superuser privilege, this superuser will be able to do **everything** on **all databases** on that instance.

Trying to do things the right way!

Grouping (objects and users):

- Using schemas for access control: all objects in each schema have the same set of privileges

- Granting privileges to groups (nologin roles) only. And granting roles to users

```
create schema orders owner orders_owner;
```

```
grant orders_owner to orders_admin;
```

```
create role orders_read_write;
```

```
create role orders_read_only;
```

```
grant select on all tables in schema orders to orders_read_only;
```

```
grant select, insert, update, delete on all tables in schema orders to orders_read_write;
```

What is not going to work?

Challenge #4: Default privileges

- **Yes, you also need to grant usage!**

```
grant usage on schema orders to orders read_write, orders_read_only
```

- **What else?**

```
alter default privileges in schema orders grant select on tables to  
orders_read_only;
```

```
alter default privileges in schema orders grant select, insert,  
update, delete on tables to orders_read_write;
```

Now:

```
create table orders.customer (  
customer_id int primary key,  
customer_name text);
```

- **Why were default permissions not applied?!**

```
alter default privileges in schema orders for role orders_owner grant  
select, insert, update, delete on tables to orders_read_write;
```

Challenge #5: The wonders of ownership!

- When you run:

```
create schema orders owner orders_owner;
```

It created a lot of privileges for orders_owner user:

```
grant all on schema orders to orders_owner
```

- But what happens when you execute

```
alter schema orders owner new_orders_owner;
```

Does anything change with permissions?

Challenges #6, #7, #8... Lots of weird things!

```
grant select orders.sales_points to role1;
grant insert, update, delete on orders.sales_points to role2;
grant role1 to user1;
grant role2 to user1;
revoke delete on orders.sales_points from user1;
```

Will this work?

- It won't, and moreover, errors won't be reported:
 - REVOKE of permissions which are not granted
 - GRANT permissions which are already granted except for roles
- You can't drop user that has any privileges
- You can't drop role cascade
- **And there is no easy way to see what permissions a given user has!**

Now imagine you have not five, not ten, but 280 databases, and new requests are coming each day!

We want to be isolated!

**A separate instance for
each new project –
possible, but expensive.**

**What are the
alternatives?**

Security Models Overview

Principles and implementation



Basic principles

The only security model to support multi-tenancy within one PostgreSQL database

Principle of least privilege

- A user is given the minimum levels of access needed to perform their job functions.

Durability

- Non-superuser users do not have a way to bypass security settings

Flexibility

- One package supports four security models with different permissions hierarchy.



Key features

Event trigger

- Forces all objects in each schema to be owned by the schema owner role and assigns default privileges

Security levels matrix

- Schema owner TRUE/FALSE
- Account owner TRUE/FALSE

Database level security

- Security modal is set up on the database level

Security-definer functions

- Schemas and roles creation/deletion are performed using security definer functions

Enabling security model

- Deploy the package
- If the package was previously deployed, the previous security settings will be used:
you can't change the existing settings for a database
- If that's the first deployment run

```
select * from grant_create_schema_users(Boolean, Boolean)
```

This will

- record security setting in the database
- enable event trigger
- grant execute on all security-definer functions to the database owner role

Security matrix

		schema_owner	
		FALSE	TRUE
account_owner	FALSE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All schemas are created and owned by db_owner. - Users are created/ assigned roles by db_owner 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All schemas are created by db_owner - Each schema has it's own owner. - Users are created/ assigned roles by db_owner
	TRUE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - db_owner creates accounts - account can create schemas - schemas are owned by account_owner - Users are created/ assigned roles by account_owner - Accounts are isolated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - db_owner creates accounts - account can create schemas - Each schema has it's own owner - Users are created/ assigned roles by account_owner - Accounts are isolated

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```
CREATE SCHEMA orders
AUTHORIZATION my_db_owner;
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN
SCHEMA orders FOR USER
my_db_owner GRANT SELECT ON
TABLES TO orders_read_only;
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN
SCHEMA orders FOR USER
my_db_owner GRANT INSERT,
UPDATE, DELETE, SELECT ON TABLES
TO orders_read_write;
```

```
CREATE SCHEMA orders
AUTHORIZATION orders_owner;
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN
SCHEMA orders FOR USER
orders_owner GRANT SELECT ON
TABLES TO orders_read_only;
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN
SCHEMA orders FOR USER
orders_owner GRANT INSERT,
UPDATE, DELETE, SELECT ON
TABLES TO orders_read_write
```

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```
CREATE SCHEMA orders
AUTHORIZATION my_account_owner;
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN
SCHEMA orders FOR USER
my_account_owner GRANT SELECT ON
TABLES TO orders_read_only;
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN
SCHEMA orders FOR USER
my_account_owner GRANT INSERT,
UPDATE, DELETE, SELECT ON TABLES
TO orders_read_write;
```

```
CREATE SCHEMA orders
AUTHORIZATION orders_owner;
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN
SCHEMA orders FOR USER
orders_owner GRANT SELECT ON
TABLES TO orders_read_only;
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN
SCHEMA orders FOR USER
orders_owner GRANT INSERT,
UPDATE, DELETE, SELECT ON
TABLES TO orders_read_write
```

Functions

create_schema_roles

Input parameters:

- schema_name
- app_user_name (opt)
- app_user_password (opt)
- ddl_user_name (opt)
- ddl_user_password (opt)
- account_owner (optional. Default current user)

Actions:

- creates schema (ownership is driven by security settings)
- creates read_write role
- creates read_only role
- creates owner role (if applicable)
- creates/assigns app and owner users

drop_schema_roles

Input parameters:

- schema_name

Actions:

- revokes read_only role from all users
- revokes read_write from all users
- revokes owner role (if applicable)
- drops all associated roles
- drops schema

assign_schema_owner_user

Input parameters:

- schema_name
- ddl_user_name
- ddl_user_password (opt)

Actions:

- creates user ddl_user_name if it does not exist
- changes password if user exists & password provided
- grants schema owner role to ddl_user_name

assign_schema_app_user

Input parameters:

- schema_name
- app_user_name
- app_user_password (opt)

Actions:

- creates user app_user_name if it does not exist
- changes password if user exists & password provided
- grants schema read_write role to app_user_name

assign_schema_ro_user

Input parameters:

- schema_name
- ro_user_name
- ro_user_password (opt)

Actions:

- creates user ro_user_name if it does not exist
- changes password if user exists & password provided
- grants schema read_only role to ro_user_name

Revoke functions

- `revoke_schema_owner_role`
- `revoke_schema_app_role`
- `revoke_schema_ro_role`

Additional security definer functions

- `select_all_privileges()`: all privileges on the current db
- `blocking_processes()`: blocking query with superuser privileges
- `pg_stat_activity()`: `pg_stat_activity` with superuser privileges

Code details

Event trigger forces new object ownership and permissions to the schema owner

```
FOR v_obj IN
  SELECT * FROM
pg_event_trigger_ddl_commands ()
  order by object_type desc
LOOP
  <fix perm>
END LOOP
```

Code details

Check whether the `current_user` has an ownership role for this schema
(`grant execute` is not enough)

```
select
  exists (
    with recursive x as
    (
      select member::regrole,
             roleid::regrole as role
      from pg_auth_members as m
      union all
      select x.member::regrole,
             m.roleid::regrole
      from pg_auth_members as m
      join x on m.member = x.role
    )
    select 1
    from x
    where
      (member::text = current_user
       and role = (select nspowner::regrole from
pg_namespace
                  where nspname=p_schema_name)
       or current_user=(select
(nspowner::regrole)::text from pg_namespace
                          where nspname=p_schema_name)
      )
  );
```

Code details

Checking the execution stack inside security definer function

```
if not
    perm_check_stack(
'dba_tools.perm_drop_schema_roles')
    then
        raise exception 'You are not allowed
to drop schema %', p_schema_name;
end if;
```

Future work

- Reporting
- Unit tests
- Conversion automation



Q&A

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