

# Simple but Effective Server Hardening

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[https://greenfly.org/talks/security/simple\\_hardening.html](https://greenfly.org/talks/security/simple_hardening.html)

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## Agenda

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- Classic Hardening
- Security Best Practices
- What to Avoid
- SSH Server
- SSH Client
- SSH 2FA
- Root and Sudo
- Reuse Puppet Certs
- Simple Cloud Hardening
- General Tips
- Questions?

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## Introduction

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- Security hardening more important than ever
- Was hardening infrastructure for a PCI audit
- Had to refer to an approved hardening guide
- Amazed at all the outdated and ineffective info
- A few simple steps can greatly increase security
- Certainly can harden further.

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## Classic Hardening

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- Many hardening guides written for Red Hat circa 2005
- Not necessarily *bad* advice, just deprecated/already done
- Turn off telnet
- Inetd hardening
- Disable all unnecessary services
- Tcprappers
- shadow passwords
- Disable shells on common role accounts.

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# Security Best Practices

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- Security best practices often == overall best practices
- Principle of Least Privilege
- Keep it Simple, Sysadmin
- Apply patches
- Layers of defense
- Good logging/audit trails
- Encrypt.

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## What to Avoid

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- Obscurity (changing default ports)
- Attacker-generated firewall rules (fail2ban, etc.)
- Port knocking
- Reliance on any single security measure
- Network software that doesn't support encryption
- Complexity.

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## SSH Server

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- A few basic changes to `/etc/ssh/sshd_config`
- Disable Root Login:

```
PermitRootLogin no
```

- Only use Protocol 2:

```
Protocol 2
```

- Disable Password Authentication:

```
PasswordAuthentication no
```

- Limit Crypto Options:

```
Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,  
aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr
```

```
KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
```

```
MACs hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,  
hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,  
hmac-sha2-256,hmac-ripemd160,umac-128@openssh.com
```

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## SSH Client

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- Generate strong keys:

```
ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 4096
ssh-keygen -t ed25519
```

- Use password-protected SSH keys
- Avoid copying private keys around
- Use ssh-add to cache password for limited time
- My lunch reminder:

```
ssh-add -t 3h
```

- Pay attention to host key warnings.

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## SSH 2FA

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- Requires an additional factor before login
- Some use TOTP, others SMS/Phone, or both
- A number of approaches, providers
- Many configured with PAM, others SSH client restrictions
- I like Duo's approach, but not free
- Google has wide support, free.

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## SSH 2FA Continued

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- Install Google Authenticator from distro package (libpam-google-authenticator) or [from source](#)
- Enroll each user account:

```
$ google-authenticator
```

- Scan QR code or add secret to Google Auth app
- Add to top of /etc/pam.d/sshd:

```
auth required pam_google_authenticator.so
```

- On Debian-based systems comment out:

```
@include common-auth
```

- Change /etc/ssh/sshd\_config:

```
ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
AuthenticationMethods publickey,keyboard-interactive
```

- Restart ssh service
- Login:

```
$ ssh kyle@server1.example.com
Authenticated with partial success.
Verification code:
```

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## Root and Sudo

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- Disable root/group accounts and use sudo:
  - Avoids shared passwords
  - Makes revoking access simpler
  - Provides audit trail
- Sudo best practices:
  - Restrict NOPASSWORD sudo to daemon role accounts
  - Try to avoid granting ALL access to users
  - Wrap risky commands inside custom scripts.

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## Reuse Puppet Certs

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- If you use Puppet Masters, you have internal trusted CA
- Makes internal mutual TLS auth much simpler
- Each host has cert, key, CA cert locally:

```
CERT: /var/lib/puppet/ssl/certs/${cert_name}.pem
KEY: /var/lib/puppet/ssl/private_keys/${cert_name}.pem
CA: /var/lib/puppet/ssl/certs/ca.pem
CRL: /var/lib/puppet/ssl/crl.pem
```

- To use in NGINX:

```
ssl_certificate /var/lib/puppet/ssl/certs/${cert_name}.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /var/lib/puppet/ssl/private_keys/${cert_name}.pem;
ssl_client_certificate /var/lib/puppet/ssl/certs/ca.pem;
ssl_crl /var/lib/puppet/ssl/crl.pem;
```

- Can add Subject Alt Names to Puppet certs with `dns_alt_names` option.

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## Simple Cloud Hardening

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- Delete/disable default admin account
- Don't store secrets in userdata script
- Try to generate secrets on host when possible
- Limit access even within security groups
- Encrypt internal communication
- Store sensitive data on non-root, encrypted disks.

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## General Tips

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- Use config management with configs checked into source control
- Encrypt any secrets checked into source control!
- Use orchestration software
- Use `/dev/shm` to store sensitive files
- Consider logging all new network connections
- Set up remote logging
- SSH into internal servers via bastion host
- Restrict access to networks via VPN
- Enable TLS between web services.

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# Questions?

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## Additional Resources

- This talk: [https://greenfly.org/talks/security/simple\\_hardening.html](https://greenfly.org/talks/security/simple_hardening.html)
- [Secure Secure Shell](#)
- [Google Authenticator](#)
- [@kylerankin](#)
- [kyle@getfinal.com](mailto:kyle@getfinal.com)