


Security In An IaC Defined World






What Does Bad Security Look Like?























What Does Good Security Look Like?















Hi. I'm Dwayne.



Dwayne McDaniel

• I live in Chicago

- I've been a Developer Advocate since 2016
- Co-host of <u>The Security Repo Podcast</u>
- On Twitter @mcdwayne
- mcdwayne@mastodon.social
- LinkedIn @dwaynemcdaniel
 - Happy to chat about anything, hit me up
- Outside of tech, I love improv, karaoke and going to rock and roll shows!

@mcdwavne



About GitGuardian



GitGuardian is the code security platform for the DevOps generation.

We help enterprises answer the issue of "Where are my hardcoded secrets and have they been leaked?"




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A (too brief) history of DevOps and Infrastructure as Code (IaC)







DEV





OPS






DevOps Handbook

HOW TO CREATE WORLD-CLASS AGILITY, RELIABILITY, & SECURITY IN TECHNOLOGY ORGANIZATIONS

> GENE KIM, JEZ HUMBLE, PATRICK DEBOIS, & JOHN WILLIS




A Novel About IT, DevOps, and Helping Your Business Win

Gene Kim, Kevin Behr, and George Spafford


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



















Cloud Provider Dashboards



Config files


0	menu.lst (/boot/grub) - gedit					
<u>F</u> ile Edit <u>V</u> iew <u>S</u> earcl	h <u>T</u> ools <u>D</u> ocuments <u>H</u> elp					
🗐 menu.lst 🙍						
## should update-grub create memtest86 boot option ## e.g. memtest86=true ## memtest86=false # memtest86=true						
## should update-grub adjust the value of the default booted system ## can be true or false # updatedefaultentry=false						
root savedefault	Windows XP (hd0,0)					
makeactive chainloader	+1					
root kernel	Ubuntu Linux (hd0,2) /boot/vmlinuz-2.6.15-25-386 root=/dev/hda3 ro quiet sp /boot/initrd.img-2.6.15-25-386	olash				

Declared Infrastructure State Configurations Stored As Code Infrastructure as Code






Number_of_Servers = 1









Number_of_Servers = 48







Number_of_Servers = 48 # DO NOT Allowed_IPs = /0. Allowed_Inbound_IPs = /0.




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securityContext: runAsNonRoot: false





Cloud misconfiguration causes massive data breach at Toyota Motor

News

un	06,	2023	•	4	min
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Cloud Security Data Breach

Vehicle data and customer information were exposed for over eight years due to a cloud misconfiguration at Toyota Motor that impacted over 260,000 customers.

Misconfiguration biggest culprit in cloud security incidents

While vulnerabilities are a concern, misconfigurations are still the biggest player in cloud security incidents and, therefore, should be one of the greates causes for concern in organizations. By 2023, 75% of security failures will result from inadequate management of identities, access, and privileges, up from 50% in 2020, according to Gartner.

Related content

Risk ptics FORMERLY RECIPROCITY Product ~

Solutions ~

Success v

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Unfortunately, Atlassian's error is all too common. Configuration errors were responsible for almost one-third of data breaches in 2021 and are expected to <u>99 percent of all firewall breaches</u> through 2023.

CROWDSTRIKE | BLOG

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According to publicly available data, eight of the top 10 data breaches of 2023 were related to application attack surfaces.¹ These eight breaches alone exposed almost 1.7 billion records, illustrating the potential for tremendous data loss if applications are poorly configured and lack effective protection.



Areas Of IaC Security Concern

- **1.** Misconfigurations
- 2. Access
- 3. Governance



Areas Of IaC Security Concern

1. Misconfigurations



OWASP Top 10

2021

A01:2021-Broken Access Control A02:2021-Cryptographic Failures A03:2021-Injection A04:2021-Insecure Design A05:2021-Security Misconfiguration A06:2021-Vulnerable and Outdated Components A07:2021-Identification and Authentication Failures A08:2021-Software and Data Integrity Failures A09:2021-Security Logging and Monitoring Failures* A10:2021-Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)*

* From the Survey



OWASP Top 10 Cloud Native

CNAS-1: Insecure cloud, container or or orchestration configuration

CNAS-2: Injection flaws (app layer, cloud events, cloud services)

CNAS-3: Improper authentication & authorization

CNAS-4: CI/CD pipeline & software supply chain flaws

CNAS-5: Insecure secrets storage

CNAS-6: Over-permissive or insecure network policies **CNAS-7: Using components with** known vulnerabilities **CNAS-8: Improper assets** management CNAS-9: Inadequate 'compute' resource quota limits CNAS-10: Ineffective logging & monitoring (e.g. runtime activity)



What Misconfigurations?


- **1.** Network
- 2. Secrets
- 3. Permissions

4. Data






A fully realistic and complete scale model







Network Misconfigurations







Common Network Misconfigurations
1. Leaving remote access accessible from the internet
increases the attack surface


- 2. <u>Key vault has no network Access Control List</u> <u>specified</u>
- 3. <u>Traffic to /0. allowed in firewall outbound rule</u>
- 4. Traffic from /0. allowed in firewall inbound rule

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- 5. <u>Open access allowed in firewall inbound rule</u>
- 6. Plain HTTP is used



Secrets Misconfigurations








Common Secrets Misconfigurations

- 1. Exposing a sensitive environment variable in the configuration can lead to credentials leak
- 2. ECR image scanning should be enabled
- 3. <u>Encrypting EKS secrets with AWS KMS adds another layer of</u> <u>security</u>
- 4. <u>HTTP data block can be used to leak secrets or variables</u> outside of the organization
- 5. <u>GKE metadata is not concealed</u>
- 6. <u>A GCP persistent disk is encrypted with a key specified in</u> plain text

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Permissions Misconfigurations








Common Permissions Misconfigurations

- 1. <u>Giving sudo rights to a user allows privilege escalation</u> <u>attacks</u>
- 2. <u>Using the default service account on a compute</u> instance allows an attacker to spread through the network
- 3. IAM policies should remove root access keys
- 4. Unencrypted S3 bucket can lead to data leak
- 5. <u>Cloudtrail logs validation is not enabled</u>
- 6. IAM policies should avoid using wildcards
- 7. Image should not have 'root' user



Data Misconfigurations








Common Data Misconfigurations

- 1. <u>A CloudTrail bucket has public read Access Control</u> <u>List which can lead to private data exposure</u>
- 2. Data Factory should not be publicly exposed
- 3. <u>Not encrypting Athena query results can lead to data</u> <u>leak</u>
- 4. <u>Not enforcing Workgroup configuration in Athena can</u> <u>allow clients to disable encryption settings</u>
- 5. EC2 instances use unencrypted block device
- 6. Not encrypting data at rest can lead to data leak



Other Misconfigurations







Other Common Misconfigurations

- 1. <u>An AWS CloudFront distribution allows unencrypted</u> <u>communications over HTTP</u>
- 2. <u>No SSL connection on SQL database might lead to</u> <u>data exposure</u>
- 3. ElasticSearch should use node-to-node encryption

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- 4. ElastiCache should use in-transit encryption
- 5. Kinesis should use in-transit encryption
- 6. MSK clusters should use in-transit encryption







security team members 100.1

- Alex Rice, HackerOne








Shifting Left = Introducing Security Earlier In The Software Development Lifecycle





From the Developer's seat, "Shifting Left" gets interpreted as more local testing





6. Snyk Infrastructure as Code - Freemium







Areas Of IaC Security Concern

- **1.** Misconfigurations
- 2. Access
- 3. Governance




Areas Of IaC Security Concern

2. Access




Who can touch the code AND instances??






Can I access the same services from multiple accounts?






Cross team friction?





Cloud Provider Dashboards



laC

•••

resource "google_compute_instance" "vm_instance" {
 name = "terraform-instance"
 machine_type = "f1-micro"
 initial_node_count = "3"
 boot_disk {
 initialize_params {
 image = "debian-cloud/debian-9"
 }
 retwork_interface {
 network = google_compute_network.vpc_network.name
 access_config {
 }
 }
}

Where are you storing your IaC Code?




- In the same repo as your app code?
- Different repo than your apps?
- It depends on the project?
- What IaC code?





How modular is your IaC?

IaC Monolith





Are there valid, real secrets in your IaC Code that could give someone access?



https://www.gitguardian.com/state-of-secrets-sprawl-report-2024






Areas Of IaC Security Concern


3. Governance



How do you manage what IaC invokes, and under which conditions?




Enter the (Open) Policy Agent





Enter the (Open) Policy Agent for IaC?







Good for:

- Established policy that is clear cut
- IaC Security
- Preventing unwanted access


Bad for:

- Uncertain situations
- Development work
- Innovating rapidly






Human in the loop



What about GitOps?





4 Principles of GitOps - OpenGitOps.dev

- 1. Declarative
- 2. Versioned and Immutable
- 3. Pulled Automatically
- 4. Continuously Reconciled






laC vs GitOps Workflows





Who is reviewing?









In Conclusion





Number_of_Servers = 48 # DO NOT Allowed_IPs = /0. Allowed_Inbound_IPs = /0.



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Areas Of IaC Security Concerns

- 1. Misconfigurations
- 2. Access
- 3. Governance



Tools can help with Misconfigurations
















Keep an eye on who has access



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Human in the loop? Who is reviewing?



Ċ	STEP 3	Someone on your team reviews the plan and approves the pull request	
	ö	alice approved these changes	View changes
(STEP 4	You comment 'atlantis apply'	
	B	Ikysow commented	
		atlantis apply	
	STEP 5	Atlantis runs terraform apply and comments back on the pull request	
	2	atlantisbot commented	
		Ran Apply in dir: . workspace: default	
		null_resource.demo: Creating null_resource.demo: Creation complete after 0s (ID: 4542221565395344699) Apply complete! Resources: 1 added, 0 changed, 0 destroyed.	

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- mcdwayne@mastodon.social
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