Southern California Linux Expo 2024

Secure Consumption of Open Source Software: Evaluating, Utilizing, and Contributing Safely

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Security challenges in consuming open source software

Q Evaluating open source projects through a security lens

V Project health, governance, management, and community

X Tools for securing open source software


Open source community security efforts: OpenSSF

How we can contribute to a safer ecosystem

Security challenges

Why is open source security so challenging?





intel SCALE 21x 2024 https://www.synopsys.com/software-integrity/resources/analyst-reports/open-source-security-risk-analysis.html


4 https://www.linuxfoundation.org/blog/blog/a-summary-of-census-ii-open-source-software-application-libraries-the-world-depends-on

Open source is everywhere

ALC: NO TO ALC: NO TO

Yay! We won!

Node Package Manager (NPM) | New project releases over time



Millions of packages ...

Millions of packages ... dozens of maintainers



Packages by number of maintainers

It's not just NPM

<u>npmjs.org</u>

3,639,251 packages 41,815,290 versions 822,231 maintainers 222,295 namespaces 742,169 keywords 237,045,471,901 downloads

nuget.org

624,254 packages 7,566,455 versions 85,940 maintainers 129,237 keywords 514,134,790,590 downloads

1,105,378 packages 9,970,233 versions 449,953 namespaces 70,056 keywords

proxy.golang.org

<u>pypi.org</u>

542,396 packages 5,603,074 versions 229,691 maintainers 193,748 keywords 29,768,771,520 downloads

(CP

repo1.maven.org

hub.docker.com

1,001,771 packages

10,844,967 versions

411,451 namespaces

334,237,037,105 downloads

1,713 keywords

499,556 packages 11,361,001 versions 66,310 namespaces 31,287 keywords

StatisticsRegistries: 59Versions: 97,334,410Maintainers: 1,440,484Keywords: 1,521,288Packages: 8,840,726Namespaces: 1,328,127Downloads: 1,811,443,044,372

Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)

CVE is a dictionary of common names for publicly known cybersecurity vulnerabilities, each of which receives a CVE Identifier.

CVE Identifiers make it easy to share data across separate network security databases and tools. Plus, they provide a baseline for evaluating the coverage of an organization's security tools.

- CVE = Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
- List of "all" publicly known software security vulnerabilities starting in 1999
- MITRE Corporation manages and maintains CVE on behalf of the US National Cybersecurity Division




CVEs: True or false?

A project with no CVEs is moments many CVEs.

re than a project with








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So many dependencies


- Secondary and tertiary dependencies can get well into the 100s...
- Especially with web applications



New contributors!

From GitHub:

- 2023 had the largest number of first-time contributors
- 420 million total projects (27% growth YOY)
- 4.5 billion contributions in 2023



Evaluating projects

What does it mean to consume open source software securely?

Evaluating open source projects

- 1. Review basic health—Is it active?
- 2. Check governance—Is it defined?
- 3. Review maintenance & releases—Is there a cadence?
- 4. Explore the community—Are people engaged?
- 5. Bug reporting—Is there a documented process?

What's the first thing you would look at when evaluating an open source project to use or include as a dependency?

1. Evaluating software: Basic health


- Does the project even have a maintainer anymore?
- When was the last commit?
- Look at the issue queue
 - How active is it?
 - When was the last post?
 - When was the last response to an issue?

Produ	uct 🗸 Solutions 🗸 Open Source 🗸 Pricing		Q Searcl
🗐 bejear	r/crawl-anywhere Public		(
<> Code	⊙ Issues 36 🖞 Pull requests 2 ⊙ Actions 🗄 Projects 🖽 Wiki 🕚 Security	Insights	
	Q is:issue is:open		🖓 Labels
	O 36 Open ✓ 54 Closed	Author - Label -	Projects -
	 Files not found #93 opened on Nov 17, 2017 by kemoc 		
	 Parse not correct for French and Chinese. #89 opened on Dec 28, 2015 by quinnsoft88 		
	 Add ability to bypass robots.txt on a per-host basis #88 opened on Aug 17, 2015 by grimsa 		
	 issue with require_once_all #87 opened on Aug 17, 2015 by jagdeep786 		
	HttpLoader does not fully support cookies #86 opened on Aug 11, 2015 by grimsa		
	 Title not parsed correctly for some international sites. #83 opened on Feb 24, 2015 by aravinuthala 		
	Source Export / Import bug #82 opened on Feb 14, 2015 by bejean \$\dothedarrow 4.0.1\$		

2. Evaluating software: Governance

Clearly defined governance?

- Clearly stated license? (Hopefully OSI approved)
- More than one maintainer
- Maintainers from more than one company or organization
- How are decisions made?



3. Evaluating software: Maintenance and release management

- Has there been substantial activity in the last year?
- Look at the release cadence
 - Is it documented?
 - Regularly occurring?
 - Prompt patch releases to address bugs and security issues?
- Does the project communicate announcements regularly? Does it have a blog?
- Is the latest release a "-alpha" or "-beta," or does it indicate that it is not yet production-ready?



4. Evaluating software: Community engagement

- Contributor guide?
- Extensively used?
- Is the community working toward security best practices?
 - Automated tests
 - Up-to-date dependencies

sts 14 📀 Actions 🖽 Projects 💿 Security 🗠 Insights
alistar / CONTRIBUTING.md
jeffmendoza Update CoC to be link. Clarify contributor ladder.
Preview Code Blame 47 lines (34 loc) · 1.6 KB
Contributing
All community members must abide by the OpenSSF Code of Conduct.
Feel free to open issues for bugs, feature requests, discussion, questions, help, proposals, etc.
 If you want to contribute a small fix or feature, open a PR.
If you want to contribute something larger, a discussion or proposal issue may be appropriate.
Please update docs when contributing features.
When contributing large features, upate <u>whats-new.md</u>
All git commits must have DCO
Contribitor Ladder
contributor-ladder.md
Community
Allstar is a project under the OpenSSF Securing Critical Projects Working Group (Mailing List).
Allstar <u>Slack Channel</u> for discussion.





Community



Early Bird Registration for DrupalCon Portland 2024 is open! Register by 23:59 UTC on 18 March 2024, to get \$100 off your ticket.

Register now

Contributor guide

Contribution areas

This guide is always evolving. If you'd like to help improve it, the best starting point is the Contribute to the Contributor Guide page.

The Drupal project has many areas that you can contribute to improving -- it's not

Help improve this page


Create an issue describing the problem.

5. Evaluating software: Secure bug reporting

Where do I report security issues?

- If you are here to report any sort of security issue with <u>a site hosted on WordPress.com</u>, then please <u>submit a report at the Automattic HackerOne page</u>. If the issue you're trying to report is on <u>WordPress.com</u> and is **not** a security issue, then please use their <u>support</u> <u>forums</u> instead.
- If you're having an issue with your own self-hosted WordPress.org site that is not a security issue, then please use the WordPress.org <u>support forums</u>.
- For security issues with WordPress plugins, follow the information on <u>Reporting Plugin</u> <u>Security Issues</u>.
- For security issues with the self-hosted version of WordPress, submit a report at the WordPress HackerOne page. Include as much detail as you can. Please always use HackerOne instead of Core Trac, even if the vulnerability is only in trunk, or a beta/RC release, because there are some sites that run those in production.

In all cases, you should **not** share the details with anyone else until after the fix for the bug has been officially released to the public.



Tools for securing open source software

Beyond basic health

Security tools for open source software


- Intel maintained CVE-bin-tool
- Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF):
 - OpenSSF Best Practices Badge
 - Secure Supply Chain Consumption Framework (S2C2F)
 - OpenSSF Scorecard

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CVE-bin-tool

The CVE Binary Tool can help you find known vulnerabilities in software by using data from the <u>National Vulnerability</u> <u>Database</u> (NVD) list of <u>Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures</u> (CVEs) as well as known vulnerability data from <u>Redhat</u>, <u>Open Source Vulnerability Database</u> (OSV), <u>Gitlab Advisory Database</u> (GAD), and <u>Curl</u>.

A binary scanner—Helps you determine which packages may have been included as part of a piece of software.
 Tools for scanning known component lists—Such as CSV files, SBOM formats, etc.



Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF)

The Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) seeks to make it easy to **develop, maintain, and consume** open source software safely and securely.

This includes fostering collaboration, establishing best practices, and developing innovative solutions for the open source software we all depend on.



■....**■**.

OpenSSF Working groups, projects & SIGs

Efficient vulnerability reporting and remediation

Vulnerability disclosures

I. CVD Guides SIGs

INFORM

J. OSS-SIRT SIG K. Open Source Vuln Schema (OSV) project L. OpenVEX SIG M. Vuln Autofix SIG



Metrics & metadata

Security metrics/reviews for open source projects



N \square

Identification, awareness, and education of security best practices

- A. Secure Software Development Fundamentals courses SIG

- E. Common Requirements Enumeration (CRE) project
- F. Concise & Best Practices Guides SIGs

Best practices

H. Memory Safety SIG

Q. SBOM Everywhere SIG R. OSS Fuzzing SIG Al. SBOMit project Protobom project

State of the art security tools

Security tooling



Supply chain integrity Ensuring the provenance of open source code

- S. Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts (SLSA) project T. Secure Supply Chain Consumpt Framework (S2C2F) project
- AJ. Gittuf project AK. GUAC project

Ó

Securing software repositories Collaboration between repository operators

AB. **RSTUF** project



Securing critical projects Identification of critical open source projects

U. List of Critical OS Prj, Components & Frameworks SIG

- V. Criticality score project
- W. Harvard study SIG
- X. Package Analysis project
- Y. Allstar project



AI/ML security AI/ML security at the Intersection of Artificial Intelligence and Cybersecurity

DevRel Develop Use Cases and help others learn about security

Diversity, equity & inclusion Increase representation and strengthen the overall effectiveness of the cybersecurity workforce


Projects Category-leading software initiatives



AD. Alpha-Omega AE. Sigstore AF. Core Toolchain Infrastructure (CTI)







- C. OpenSSF Best Practices Badge project
- D. OpenSSF Scorecard project

- G. Education SIG
- AG. The Security Toolbelt SIG

ω End users Voice of public & private sector organizations that primarily consume open ZG source \triangleright Z. Threat Modeling SIG

 \bigcirc

OpenSSF projects and tools OpenSSF Best Practices Badge

□ README ▲ LGPL-3.0 license ▲ Security Gramine Library OS with I	(?)	Met Unmet	The project MUST have a documented roadmap that describes what the project intends to do and not do for at least the next year. (URL required) ^[documentation_roadmap] Show details
docs passingopenssf best practicespassingA Linux-compatible LibraryFr Multi-Process AWhat is Gramine?	(?)	MetUnmetN/A?	The project MUST include documentation of the architecture (aka high-level design) of the software produced by the project. If the project does not produce software, select "not applicable" (N/A). (URL required) [documentation_architecture] Show details
Gramine (formerly called <i>Graphen</i> lightweigh host requirements. Gramine can run cations in a complete OS in a virtual machine Louding gue process migration. Gramine supports native, unmodified Linux binaries	(?)	Met Unmet N/A ?	The project MUST document what the user can and cannot expect in terms of security from the software produced by the project (its "security requirements"). (URL required) ^[documentation_security] Show details
SGX enclaves on Linux platforms. In untrusted cloud and edge deployments, there is infrastructure. Gramine supports this "lift and shift Confidential Computing with Intel SGX. Gramine ca	\odot	 Met Unmet N/A ? 	The project MUST provide a "quick start" guide for new users to help them quickly do something with the software. (URL required) ^[documentation_quick_start] Show details
minimal porting effort.	https://www.libro	eoffice.org/get-	help/documentation/


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certify) best

OpenSSF projects and tools OpenSSF Scorecard

What is it?

- Quick, easy project assessment via list of automated checks for best practices
- What does it help protect me from?
 - Malicious maintainers and packages
 - Poorly maintained projects
 - Compromised build systems and/or code
- How do I use it?
 - Command line interface (CLI)
 - GitHub Action



OpenSSF projects and tools OpenSSF Scorecard

Score in terminal ...

			kdruckma — -zsh — 223×78
inished [inished [inished [inished [inished [inished [inished [inished [inished [inished]	Packaging] Signed-Releases] Code-Review] SAST] Dangerous-Workflow]		
ESULTS			
ggregate heck scor	score: 5.1 / 10 res:		
SCORE	NAME	REASON	DOCUMENTATION/REMEDIATION
10 / 10	Binary-Artifacts	no binaries found in the repo	
0 / 10	Branch-Protection	branch protection not enabled on development/release branches	https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/4968eed3a423f080572b5c360f1bbca9e8ase799/docs/checks.md#branch-protection
0 / 10	CI-Tests	2 out of 29 merged PRs checked by a CI test score normalized to 0	https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/40c0eed3a423f00c872b5c3cVf1bbcsVe8aae7VV/docs/checks.md#ci-tests
0 / 10	CII-Best-Practices	no effort to earn an OpenSSF best practices badge detected	https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/49c0eed3a423f00c872b5c3c9f1bbca9e8aae799/docs/checks.md#cii-best-practices
6 / 10	Code-Review	found 12 unreviewed changesets out of 30 score normalized to 6	https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/49c0eed3a423f00c872b5c3c9f1bbca9e8aae799/docs/checks.md#code-review
10 / 10	Contributors	3 different organizations found score normalized to 10	https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/40c0eed3a423f00c872b5c3c0f1bbca0e8aae790/docs/checks.md#contributors
10 / 10	Dangerous-Workflow	no dangerous workflow patterns detected	https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/49c8eed3a423f00c872b5c3c9f1bbca9e8aae799/docs/checks.md#dangerous-workflow
0 / 10	Dependency-Update-Tool	no update tool detected	- https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/49c0eed3a423f00c872b5c3c9f1bbca9e8aae799/docs/checks.md#dependency-update-tool
0 / 10		project is not fuzzed	https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/49c0eed3a423f00c872b5c3c9f1bbca9e8aae799/docs/checks.md#fuzzing
9 / 10	License	license file detected	https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/49c0eed3a423f00c872b5c3c9f1bbca9e8aae799/docs/checks.md#license
10 / 10	Maintained	3 commit(s) out of 30 and 13 issue activity out of 30 found in the last 90 days score normalized to 10	https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/49c0eed3a423f00c07205c3c9f1b0ca9e0aae799/docs/checks.mdmaintsined
?	Packaging	no published package detected	https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/49c0eed3a423f00c872b5c3c9f1bbca9e8aae799/docs/checks.md#packaging
0 / 10	Pinned-Dependencies	dependency not pinned by hash detected score normalized	https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/49c0eed3a423f00c872b5c3c9f1bbca9e8aae799/docs/checks.md#pinned-dependencies

... or via browser

	👲 OpenSSF Scorecard Report		
5.5	github.com/google/python-fire commit: 343e6b6cec2d174d511e99dec7e5a24849121c2e GENERATED AT: 2024-03-04	Risk level (desc)	~
⊘ 10	Dangerous-Workflow CRITICAL Determines if the project's GitHub Action workflows avoid dangerous patterns.		•
× 0	Branch-Protection HIGH Determines if the default and release branches are protected with GitHub's branch protection settings	5.	•
× 0	Token-Permissions HIGH Determines if the project's workflows follow the principle of least privilege.		•
	Code-Review HIGH		

OpenSSF projects and tools

Secure Supply Chain Consumption Framework (S2C2F)

The S2C2F project works to further develop and improve the S2C2F guide, which outlines how to securely consume open source software (OSS) dependencies.

Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4
Minimum OSS Governance Program	Secure Consumption and Improved MTTR	Alware Defense and Zero-Day Detection	Advanced Threat Defense
 Use package managers Local copy of artifact Scan with known vulns Scan for software licenses Inventory OSS Manual OSS updates 	 Scan for end life Have an incident response plan Auto OSS updates Alert on vulns at PR time Audit that consumption is through the approved ingestion method Validate integrity of OSS Secure package source file configuration 	 Deny list capability Clone OSS source Scan for malware Proactive security reviews Enforce OSS provenance Enforce consumption from curated feed 	 Validate the SBOMs of OSS consumed Rebuild OSS on trusted infrastructure Digitally sign rebuilt OSS Generate SBOM for rebuilt OSS Digitally sign protected SBOMs Implement fixes

Putting the tools to work

Let's evaluate some software

Evaluating open source projects

- 1. Review basic health—Is it active?
- 2. Check governance—Is it defined?
- 3. Review maintenance & releases—Is there a cadence?
- 4. Explore the community—Are people engaged?
- 5. Bug reporting—Is there a documented process?
- 6. Run OpenSSF Scorecard

OpenSSF projects and tools Grab a random repo

You can apply some optional filters:	
Any Language 🗸	git -random
Topic Any Topic Next	Picks a random public GitHub repository across all languages and topics. Create a shortlist of repos to view them all at once or save them for later viewing
★ (25936) \$ (1505) ③ (25936) (Python)	Download List of Selected Repos Open All © 2020 DigitalBunker

Basic health check: Looks promising!

Python Fire python 2.7 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.9

Python Fire is a library for automatically generating command line in object.

- Python Fire is a simple way to create a CLI in Python. [1]
- Python Fire is a helpful tool for developing and debugging Python code.
- Python Fire helps with exploring existing code or turning other people's code into
- Python Fire makes transitioning between Bash and Python easier. [4]
- Python Fire makes using a Python REPL easier by setting up the REPL with the r need already imported and created. [5]

Installation

To install Python Fire with pip, run: pip install fire

To install Python Fire with conda, run: conda install fire -c conda-forge

To install Python Fire from source, first clone the repository and then run: python se

1		
No OpenSSF Best Practices Badge?	r any Python	Used by 28k
code. [2] ole's code into a CLI. [3] 4] PL with the modules and	variables you'll	 Weight and Construction Weight and Construction Weight and Construction All contributors All contributors All contributors Python 100.0%
forge n: python setup.py inst	all	

Issue queue

🖵 google / python-fire	e (Public)	다 Notifications 🔮 Fork 1.5k	☆ Star 25.9k -
<> Code · Issues 122	2 🗈 Pull requests 26 🕞 Actions 🖽 Projects 🕕 Security 🗠 Insights		
	Q is:issue is:open	© Labels 9 ♀ Milestones 0 New issue	
	O 122 Open ✓ 181 Closed Author - Label -	Projects - Milestones - Assignee - Sort -	
	Cannot parse list of strings containing is #481 opened 2 weeks ago by rentruewang		
	Remove test requirement on mock #469 opened on Nov 1, 2023 by dvzrv		
	 Version flag alongside other commands #468 opened on Oct 11, 2023 by amin-nejad 	Ç 3	
	Ifeature request] Exclude function (kw)args from synopsis, arguments and flags in help output (enhancen #465 opened on Sep 29, 2023 by eelkevdbos	ment	
	 [feature request] support multiple dialects for boolean parameters #461 opened on Aug 31, 2023 by iRyoka 	D 3	
	• Warning Deprecation: Legacy 'setup.py' #460 opened on Aug 17, 2023 by nitipit		
	 Strings args do not need to be parsed. #459 opened on Jul 11, 2023 by hxse 	D 3	
	 Fire needs to include features like in ArgParse enhancement #457 opened on Jul 3, 2023 by vihaanmody1 		
	[Question] Even if no type hints is supplied, would python-fire accept stub files? question #456 opened on May 16, 2023 by Diogo-Rossi		
	 Add Docker Image for easier setup #455 opened on May 12, 2023 by Faizan-Alam-1 		

Pull requests

					🗘 Notif	ications 😵 Fork 1.5k
ssues 122 1 Pull requests 26 🕟 Actions 🖽 Projects 🛈 Security 🗠	✓ Insights					
Q is:open is:pr			0	Labels 9	⇔ Milestones 0	New pull request
Clear current search query, filters, and sorts						
12 26 Open 🗸 142 Closed	Author -	Label -	Projects -	Milestones -	- Reviews -	Assignee - Sort -
Docstring description multiline parsing ~ #476 opened on Dec 22, 2023 by thebadcoder96					⊙ 1	口 22
\$1\$ added venv doc link in readme #467 opened on Oct 8, 2023 by krishvsoni						Ç 2
ຳ #444: Removed pipes dependency #447 opened on Apr 7, 2023 by BasedDepartment1						C 6
In Fix pandas.DataFrame support in corePrintResult ✓ #446 opened on Mar 31, 2023 by paul-ada						7 2
ຳ ci: watcher for automerge × #435 opened on Feb 2, 2023 by Borda						Ç 20
ំំង adding GH dependabot × #432 opened on Feb 1, 2023 by Borda						1 7
\$1 Support case-insensitive usage #426 opened on Dec 23, 2022 by dukecat0						
Detect the program name when python -m was executed #424 opened on Dec 17, 2022 by dukecat0					⊙ 1	Ç 4
\$1 Support SkipParse decorator ~ #408 opened on Sep 25, 2022 by link89						Ç 7

OpenSSF Scorecard: Manual CLI scan—Terminal

scorecard --repo github.com/google/python-fire



OpenSSF Scorecard: Manual CLI scan—Browser

👲 OpenSSF Scorecard Report		⊘10	Vulnerabilities HICH
 github.com/google/python-fire commit: 343e6b6cec2d174d511e99dec7e5a24849121c2e generated at: 2024-03-04 	SORT: Risk level (desc) V	⊗ 0	Fuzzing MEDIUM The project uses fuzzing.
On Dangerous-Workflow CRITICAL Determines if the project's GitHub Action workflows avoid dangerous patterns.	~	⊗ 0	Pinned-Dependencies MEDIUM Determines if the project has declared and pinned the dependencies of its build process.
O Branch-Protection нюн Determines if the default and release branches are protected with GitHub's branch pr	▼	⊗ 0	SAST MEDIUM Determines if the project uses static code analysis.
O Token-Permissions HIGH Determines if the project's workflows follow the principle of least privilege.	*	[⊘] 10	Security-Policy MEDIUM Determines if the project has published a security policy.
Code-Review HIGH Determines if the project requires human code review before pull requests (aka merged)	▼ e requests) are merged.	× 0	CII-Best-Practices Low Determines if the project has an OpenSSF (formerly CII) Best Practices Badge.
Maintained HIGH Determines if the project is "actively maintained".	•	 ✓ 9 	License Low Determines if the project has defined a license.
Binary-Artifacts HIGH Determines if the project has generated executable (binary) artifacts in the source rep	vository.	?	Packaging MEDIUM • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Vulnerabilities HIGH Determines if the project has open, known unfixed vulnerabilities.	~	?	Signed-Releases HIGH Determines if the project cryptographically signs release artifacts.

OpenSSF web report: Protocol buffers



The good:

- No dangerous workflows!
- Maintained!
- Security policy!
- Even fuzzing!



The less good:

- No signed releases
- Static analysis
- Branch protection unknown

	🎍 OpenSSF Scorecard Report	
7.5	github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf commt: 5993e86986ab5388e6b8441aeb278bc24a48852e generated at; 2024-02-27T2144/20Z Sort: Risk level (desc)	~
[©] 10	Dangerous-Workflow CRITICAL Determines if the project's OitHub Action workflows avoid dangerous patterns.	*
<mark>0</mark>	Signed-Releases High Determines if the project cryptographically signs release artifacts.	*
° 7	Code-Review HIGH Determines if the project requires human code review before pull requests (aka merge requests) are merged.	٣
⊙ 9	Vulnerabilities Not Determines if the project has open, known unliked vulnerabilities.	Ŧ
[⊙] 10	Binary-Artifacts Hitch Determines if the project has generated executable (binary) artifacts in the source repository.	Ŧ
[⊙] 10	Dependency-Update-Tool HIGH Determines if the project uses a dependency update tool.	Ŧ
[⊙] 10	Maintained Hitter Determines if the project is "actively maintained".	•
⊙ 10	Token-Permissions File: Determines if the project's workflows follow the principle of least privilege.	*
<mark>⊘</mark> 0	Pinned-Dependencies MEDUAL Determines if the project has declared and pinned the dependencies of its build process.	*
[⊗] 0	SAST DEtermines if the project uses static code analysis.	*
⊙ 10	Fuzzing MEDIMA Determines if the project uses fuzzing.	*
⊙ 10	Security-Policy MEDIO: Determines if the project has published a security policy.	*
<mark>⊘</mark> 0	CII-Best-Practices	*
⊙ 9	CI-Tests Iov Determines if the project runs tests before pull requests are merged.	*
© 9	License Tow Determines if the project has defined a license.	•
[©] 10	Contributors Com. Determines if the project has a set of contributors from multiple organizations (e.g., companies).	*
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
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